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CRIMINAL APPEAL: EVIDENCE, HEARSAY 
 
Summary 
  
 The Court determined that a declarant must have testified and have been subject to cross-
examination about a specific out-of-court statement for it to be excluded from the definition of 
hearsay as a prior inconsistent statement or identification. Further, the Court held that the errors of 
admission made by the district court were harmless.  
 
Background 
 
 Appellant Dvontae Richard was convicted of crimes committed during two incidents that 
occurred four days apart. Only the second incident is relevant to this appeal.  
On the date of the second incident, Kirsten Kinard and his cousin, Eric Blake, were at a car 
wash when Richard, walking with an unidentified man, approached Kinard and grabbed his Cuban 
link gold necklace valued at approximately $45,000. Kinard’s cousin reacted by discharging his 
firearm. Richard’s accomplice returned fire. During the shooting, people were hit, including 
Kinard and a person wearing a red hood.  
 Police arrived on the scene. They tracked down Richard with the help of witnesses and by 
following a trail of his blood. Both Kinard and Richard were taken to University Medical Center 
(UMC) for treatment. At UMC, the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) 
interviewed Kinard as a victim and Richard as a suspect.  
 At UMC, Richard made statements to Detective Weirauch and Detective Spiotto which 
included inculpatory remarks. Richard made these statements after the detectives read Richard his 
Miranda rights. The statements were recorded and transcribed. Kinard described Richard to 
Detective Weirauch. He identified Richard when he was wheeled past Richard’s hospital room.  
 Richard made a pre-trial motion to suppress his prior statement to police. After an 
evidentiary hearing, the district court denied the motion and allowed the State to use the statements 
because it met its burden by demonstrating Richard’s statements were made voluntarily. 
 When Kinard testified at trial he responded “no” when asked if he could identify Richard 
as the person who “snatched” his chain. Kinard was never asked about the identification during 
the trial. A jury convicted of various crimes.  
 On appeal Richard argues that Kinard’s identification at the hospital provided by 
Weirauch’s testimony is inadmissible hearsay and that his inculpatory statements introduced at 
trial were involuntary and thus violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  
 
Discussion  
 
Detective Weirauch’s testimony  
 
 The district court allowed the state to present testimony by Weirauch involving Kinard’s 
initial statements identifying Richard. Richard argues that this testimony was hearsay and violated 
his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. 
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NRS 51.035 defines hearsay as “a statement offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted," but exempts certain statements from that broad definition. A statement is not 
hearsay if: "the declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination 
concerning the statement, and the statement is: (a) Inconsistent with the declarant's testimony."2 
The Court reviewed the admission of the testimony for abuse of discretion.  
 
Kinard’s description of his attacker 
  
 At trial, Kinard was unwilling to testify as to the identity of Richard. Further, he was not 
asked about his previous statements to Detective Weirsauch at any time during trial. Weirsauch 
testified that Kinard described Richard as a “black male adult wearing a [red] hoodie.” The State 
contends the detective’s testimony was properly admitted according to NRS 51.035(2)(a) because 
Kinard testified, was subject to cross-examination, and his testimony was inconsistent with 
Weirsauch’s testimony.  
 However, the Court determined that the district court should not have allowed Weirsauch’s 
testimony about Richard’s race to be admitted. The Court reasoned that Kinard did not testify 
inconsistently with his initial description of Richard. However, it held that because Richard 
admitted to grabbing Kinard’s chain, Weirsauch’s testimony about race did not prejudice Richard.  
 
Kinard’s Identification  
 
 The State contends that the testimony regarding Kinard’s identification while in the 
hospital is admissible because it was a proper impeachment as a prior inconsistent statement and 
that is was admissible as an identifying statement in accordance with NRS 51.035(2)(c).  The Court 
addressed the two contentions separately.  
 
Prior Inconsistent Statement  
 
 NRS 51.035 permits admission of a statement made out-of-court if "the declarant testifies 
at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the 
statement is: inconsistent with the declarant's testimony." The Court found that Kinard’s prior 
identification of Richard are out-of-court statements that fail to meet the necessary requirements 
for admission pursuant to NRS 51.035(2)(a) and NRS 50.135(2)(b) because the State neglected to 
ask Kinard about his initial identification of Richard at the hospital. Therefore, Kinard was not 
“subject to cross-examination concerning the statement" as required by NRS 51.035(2) or given 
an opportunity to explain or deny the statement. Accordingly, the Court determined that 
Weirauch’s testimony was not properly admitted as an inconsistent statement in accordance with 
NRS 50.135(2).  
 
Prior Identification  
  
 NRS 51.035(2)(c) provides that an out-of-court statement is not hearsay if "the declarant 
testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and 
the statement is . . . one of identification of a person made soon after perceiving the person.” 
 The State argued that "identifying statements made by a declarant who testifies and is 
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subject to cross examination are not hearsay." The State relied on Jones v. State to support its 
argument that when a “declarant identifies the defendant out-of-court, soon after perceiving the 
defendant, the identifying statement may be admitted as an exception to hearsay."3 The Court 
found the State’s reliance on Jones was misplaced.  
 The Court explained that the State ignored a crucial portion of the statute which requires 
the declarant be subject to cross-examination concerning the relevant statement. It held that the 
district court abused its discretion by admitting Weirauch's testimony because the statement was 
not properly admitted as either a prior inconsistent statement or prior identification. However, the 
Court held that the error was harmless.  
 
Richard’s inculpatory statements 
 
 Richard argued that the admission of his statements to the police violated his Fourteenth 
Amendment rights based on the circumstances surrounding the statements. The Court looked to 
the totality of the circumstances to determine if the confessions made by Richard are admissible.  
 
Richard’s Statement to Detective Weirauch 
 
 Richard gave his statement to Weirauch shortly after being shot in the leg and while in the 
hospital, which Richard contends makes the statements involuntary. The Court considered the 
decisions in Chambers v. State4 and Wallace v. State5 to determine that Richard’s circumstances 
did not render his statements involuntary. The Court reasoned that although Richard’s responses 
to question were not direct, they do not show proof of an altered state of consciousness.  
 
Richard’s Statement to Detective Spiotto 
 
 Spiotto took Richard’s statement the day after the shooting. Richard contends that his 
statements were involuntary based on the interview taking place at 10:30pm, injuries, location, 
and medical treatment. Based on the circumstances surrounding Richard’s second statement, the 
Court held that the district court made the correct determination that Richard’s statement was in 
fact voluntary.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court clarified that unless an individual testifies to and is subject to cross-examination 
regarding the actual out-of-court statement, that statement is not excluded from the definition of 
hearsay as a prior inconsistent statement or a prior identification. Accordingly, the Court held that 
the district court admitted some prior statements in error, but that the errors were harmless. Further, 
the Court affirmed the district court’s judgment of conviction.  
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